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Abstract: 
Studies on the role of national parliaments in the EU have conventionally looked at the formal capabilities 
and activities of legislatures as collective actors. We aim to strengthen the bridge to the growing literature on 
the politicisation of the EU by examining individual-level mobilisation within the parliament. In order to 
enrich our understanding of the actors and inner workings that drive or impede the parliamentarisation of EU 
politics, we shift the focus from preferences to opportunity and incentive structures and levels of party 
control faced by different categories of MPs. Our case study of plenary debates on the Greek crisis in the 
German Bundestag (2010–2015) analyses three types of activity: legislative speech, voting defection and 
explanations of vote. Our results show that different thresholds of mobilisation translate into intra-party 
variance based on MPs’ rank, experience, electoral mandate and gender. Here, the frontbencher–backbencher 
categorisation shows the most consistent effect. 
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In their article ‘Backbenchers learn to fight back: European integration and parliamentary 
government’, Raunio and Hix (2000) suggest that national parliaments in the European Union (EU) 
are claiming back some control of executive actors by redressing the information asymmetry and 
introducing scrutiny instruments. According to their argument, this parliamentarisation of EU 
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politics is driven by ‘the desire by non-governing parties and backbench parliamentarians’ (ibid.: 
163). Yet, most research in this field analyses the increasing importance of national legislatures and 
their capabilities to hold the executives accountable and communicate EU affairs to the electorate at 
the collective level. In this article, we enquire whether backbenchers have indeed learned to fight 
back. More than two decades after the first milestone of parliamentary Europeanisation, namely the 
establishment of European Affairs Committees (EACs), it is time to test Raunio and Hix’s claim. 
The Eurozone crisis provides an exemplary case for testing whether it is no longer merely executive 
actors and a small number of frontbenchers and ‘Euro-wizards’ (Auel 2006: 262) who drive 
parliamentary mobilisation around EU issues. The euro crisis has shifted EU decision-making to the 
forefront of public debate and protest. This is even the case in Germany, where traditionally public 
support for European integration has been strong and where the lower house, the Bundestag, has 
been characterised by a solid pro-European cross-partisan consensus. During the crisis this 
consensus somewhat disintegrated, mainly due to dissent within parties rather than between parties. 
As Germany is the largest creditor country (contributing around 27 per cent to the crisis measures), 
the crisis also posed a challenge to the budget sovereignty of the Bundestag. 
In this article, we place the individual level at the heart of our analysis in order to enhance our 
understanding of the actors and inner workings that drive or impede the parliamentarisation of EU 
politics. We empirically investigate intra-party variation in parliamentary activity in Bundestag 
debates on the Greek crisis. The Greek debt crisis allows us to examine patterns of intra-party 
mobilisation around one specific issue that has become increasingly controversial between 2010 
and 2015. We focus on three types of individual-level activity that are visible to the public: (1) 
voting behaviour (especially defection), (2) plenary speeches and (3) explanations of vote (EoVs). 
Our analysis of roll-call votes (RCVs) suggests that voting unity only tells us part of the story 
because some parties enforce discipline more strictly than others and the incentive to toe the party 
line varies between different categories of members of parliament (MPs). In the case of the 
Bundestag, access to the plenary floor is tightly controlled by party leaders (Proksch and Slapin 
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2015a), which means that plenary debates may project disproportionate party cohesion as 
backbenchers and dissenting MPs are unlikely to receive speaking time. But any MP can deliver an 
EoV to provide justification for her voting decision and/or voice reservations. EoVs are therefore a 
very useful additional data source for the study of party cohesion. 
Our comprehensive approach addresses some of the limitations faced by studies that focus 
solely on voting behaviour, primarily because we shift the focus from preferences to the incentive 
and opportunity structures of legislators and look at individual-level behaviour in the context of 
institutional constraints. Our analysis confirms the significance of party control in setting the room 
of manoeuvre for individual MPs. We test how an MP’s electoral mandate, length of membership 
and rank affect her legislative behaviour. While we find some evidence that mandate, experience as 
well as gender matter, the distinction between frontbenchers and backbenchers shows the most 
consistent effect across all three types of activity. Another key finding is that EoVs, despite their 
limited visibility, provide a meaningful channel of expression for MPs with limited influence. 
The first section defines politicisation in the parliamentary setting and conceptualises 
mobilisation as the third stage in the politicisation process. In the second section, we discuss the 
significance of party control in shaping individual-level behaviour and theorise its divergent effects 
on MPs depending on their mandate, experience, position or office, and gender. Here, we develop 
several expectations that structure our empirical analysis. Before presenting the results of our 
regression analysis, we introduce our case study, data set, methods and descriptive results. The final 
section summarises the contribution of this study and outlines directions for future research. 
 
EU politicisation in national parliaments 
In the course of European integration, as more and more competences have been shifted to the 
supranational level, national parliaments have gradually adapted to the political and legal realities 
of EU multilevel governance. Since the establishment of EACs, which accelerated in the 1990s, the 
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scholarly interest in the Europeanisation processes of national parliaments and their role as a source 
of legitimation for the EU polity has steadily increased. Comparative scholars (Karlas 2012; Raunio 
2005; Winzen 2012; 2013) have classified and ranked national parliaments by measuring their 
legislative scrutiny capability and impact on the governments’ negotiating position. Auel et al. 
(2015) recognise that previous comparative endeavours focused solely on the formal capabilities 
and legislative function of parliaments, and attempt to establish the link between institutional 
capacity and actual levels of parliamentary activity. While institutional strength1 shows a strong 
correlation with the number of mandates and resolutions issued, the correlation with debating 
activity is very weak. This is an intriguing finding, especially when considering the recent shift in 
the literature from the legislative and oversight activities to the communicative role, that is, from 
the government-related function to the citizen-related function of member state legislatures (Miklin 
2014; Rauh 2015; Wendler 2016). There is an increasing recognition of the importance of public 
parliament debates on EU issues, but we still lack a thorough understanding of the conditions, 
mechanisms and actors that drive these debates. The growing literature on politicisation can provide 
some insights into these questions. 
Our understanding of politicisation draws on Mouffe’s (2005: 8–34; 2014) definition of ‘the 
political’ as the site of conflict and antagonism, rather than liberty and common action. According 
to Mouffe (2005: 10), ‘political questions are not mere technical issues to be solved by experts’ but 
‘always involve decisions which require us to make a choice between conflicting alternatives’. 
Following this line of thought, politicisation is the making visible of conflicting alternatives. In the 
context of EU politics, the term politicisation has been used frequently, almost excessively, in 
recent years. Often, it is merely an umbrella term (deliberately placed in quotation marks) to 
describe a general intensification in the level of contention and the way the EU and its policies are 
publicly perceived and debated at the domestic level. There have been only few attempts to 
thoroughly conceptualise and operationalise politicisation as a process – or rather processes – of 
contestation. Neofunctionalists anticipated a politicisation of European integration for a long time: 
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Politicization … refers initially to a process whereby the controversiality of joint 
decisionmaking goes up. This in turn is likely to lead to a widening of the audience or 
clientele interested and active in integration. … The minimal threshold for politicization 
is a rise in the controversiality of the regional decisionmaking process. (Schmitter 1969: 
166, italics in original) 
Similarly to Schmitter, de Wilde (2011: 566–7) emphasises contentiousness when defining 
politicisation as ‘an increase in polarization of opinions, interests or values and the extent to which 
they are publicly advanced towards policy formulation within the EU’. This definition also implies 
the centrality of communication. 
When it comes to operationalising politicisation, de Wilde and Zürn (2012) use three 
indicators: growing awareness, mobilisation and polarisation. This broad operationalisation can be 
adapted to the parliamentary setting. In fact, we argue elsewhere (Bhattacharya 2017) that these 
indicators can be regarded as three subsequent stages: (1) growing awareness among MPs, (2) an 
increase in controversiality2 and (3) mobilisation. If MPs acknowledge that EU politics and 
domestic politics are mutually intertwined and are aware of their own role in the multi-level 
decision-making process, they possess the capacity to recognise the domestic implications and 
contentious nature of a given issue and their individual means of influence. Controversiality needs 
to not only be detected but also made visible, that is, communicated, to the public through 
mobilisation. 
For de Wilde and Zürn (2012), who employ a much broader approach by referring to the 
activities of political parties, social movements, trade unions and civil society organisations, 
mobilisation is ‘an increase over time in the amount of resources spent in conflict on EU issues and 
the number of political actors engaged’ (140, emphasis added). In the parliamentary setting, 
mobilisation – or the lack thereof – has been studied empirically by measuring the time invested for 
debating EU issues in the plenary (Auel and Raunio 2014; Raunio 2015), while other scholars 
(García Lupato 2014; Rauh 2015) use EU references in legislative speeches as a ‘test’ for EU 
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politicisation. Both approaches focus on salience as the key determinant of adequate parliamentary 
communication, but it can be questioned to what extent salience actually reflects conflict, taking 
into account the power of agenda control. (When a party or coalition government is internally 
divided over an issue, party leaders have a strong incentive to keep this issue off the agenda.) Auel 
and Raunio (2014: 24) also conclude that ‘plenary debates are more frequent in the absence of 
strong party political conflict and Eurosceptic public opinion’. 
For national parliaments to communicate divergent views on EU matters, it seems crucial that 
a diverse range of parliamentary actors is involved. Thus, this study shifts the focus from the 
collective level to the level of legislative parties and individual legislators. As Kröger and Bellamy 
(2016: 139) point out, it is key to distinguish ‘between the institutional structures national 
parliaments have developed to domesticate the EU, on the one hand, and the usage of those 
structures by individual MPs and political parties in ways that normalise debates on the EU, on the 
other’. 
 
Legislative behaviour at the individual level 
Conventionally, the literature on the role of national parliaments has looked at legislatures as 
collective entities. In order to get an insight into the internal workings that determine the content of 
parliamentary debates on the EU, we need to gain a comprehensive understanding of the type of 
legislators who are willing and in a position to invest resources, particularly time, and voice their 
opinion in EU debates. However, when shifting the focus to MPs as individual actors, we have to 
address the role of parliamentary parties in shaping individual-level behaviour. 
 
The significance of party control 
As is the case with parliaments, legislative parties are not unitary actors. They are internally 
divided, deeply hierarchical organisations, in which the leadership feels the responsibility to 
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maintain unity and possesses a significant amount of resources and disciplinary instruments to do 
so. Generally, party leaders control the assignment of committee seats, access to the plenary floor 
and, to some extent, the media access as well. Furthermore, they are in a position to distribute 
rewards such as attractive trips abroad, office space or tickets to popular events. (Bailer 2017) 
Hence, when we look at the behaviour of legislators in order to draw inferences about their 
preferences, we need to be aware that their room of manoeuvre is constrained by their membership 
in a parliamentary party. As Saalfeld and Strøm (2014: 372) aptly point out, ‘the world of 
legislative parties is one of considerable complexity, in which critical decisions are often 
unobservable or deliberately concealed’. Conceptually, we can make a distinction between party 
cohesion and party discipline, that is, between substantive agreement based on shared preferences, 
on the one hand, and cooperation under compulsion and anticipated sanctions, on the other hand 
(Hazan 2014). Empirically, however, we face a serious ‘observability problem’: ‘Absent direct 
measures of legislators’ policy preferences, one cannot identify whether a party is united because its 
members have similar preferences … or because party leaders successfully impose discipline on 
outlying members’ (Kam 2014: 402). A third factor that might affect observed levels of party unity 
is agenda control, that is, the ability to avert votes on disputed issues (Carey 2007), but in the 
German Bundestag, agenda-setting powers do not vary significantly between government and 
opposition parties (Becher and Sieberer 2008: 295–6). This ‘black box’ makes it challenging to 
assess the impact of party control on legislative behaviour. 
Our empirical analysis focuses on RCVs, legislative speech and EoVs. For each form of 
activity, the level of party control and public visibility differs, which means that the threshold of 
mobilisation varies as well. Proksch and Slapin (2015b: 25–7) argue that how legislators choose to 
voice their disagreement with the party leadership depends on the level of discontent. Defecting 
from party line on a recorded vote, ‘especially on one that is both high profile and whipped, 
constitutes the ultimate act of defiance’ (ibid.: 26). The act of defection may help MPs to raise their 
profile independent of the party label, but rebels risk to be punished by the party whips. 
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MPs who dissent less strongly or fear the potential sanctions for a defective vote may, at least 
in theory, choose to raise their concerns in a plenary speech instead. In the case of the German 
Bundestag, however, party leaders have formal control of the plenary floor by deciding who gets to 
speak on behalf of the parliamentary party group and for how long. Proksch and Slapin (2015a: 
100–23) also show that in highly salient debates, German party leaders are more likely to speak 
themselves and MPs who are ideologically distant from the party leadership tend to give fewer 
speeches (whereas the opposite is the case in the House of Commons). Bailer (2017: 7) quotes a 
party group leader in the Bundestag: ‘Of course, you are only allowed to talk in the morning when 
Phoenix [public TV news channel] is reporting if you are a loyal party group member. The 
dissenters are only allowed at night.’ Therefore, dissenting speeches are extremely rare in the 
Bundestag. In February 2012, when the second aid package for Greece was passed, two dissenters 
from the governing parties (Klaus-Peter Willsch and Frank Schäffler) spoke on the plenary floor, 
but only because the president of the Bundestag allocated them extra speaking time. 
Contrary to addressing the plenary assembly, every legislator in the German Bundestag has an 
equal opportunity to state the reasons for her voting decision in an EoV (Becher and Sieberer 2008: 
296). EoVs are written statements signed by one or more MPs that are annexed to the official 
minutes and often published on MPs’ personal websites. Since there are no party political 
constraints for the usage of this instrument, it provides a channel to explain defection or voice 
reservations despite voting along party line (Sieberer 2015). Although its public visibility is 
relatively low, the usage of EoVs is a good measure of mobilisation across and within 
parliamentary party groups. 
 
Theorising intra-party variance in mobilisation 
The variety of control mechanisms and disciplinary measures do not affect legislators equally. The 
threshold of mobilisation is contingent upon the mandate, experience and rank of the individual 
MP. Previous studies suggest that personal characteristics such as gender could also be a relevant 
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factor. We would thus expect to find intra-party variance in legislative behaviour for different 
categories of MPs. 
The German Bundestag employs a mixed-member proportional system, which makes it an 
interesting case to investigate whether behavioural differences exist between MPs elected from 
single-member districts and MPs elected via closed party lists. The existing literature on legislative 
behaviour in the Bundestag provides mixed results regarding this question (see e.g. Becher and 
Sieberer 2008; Degner and Leuffen 2016; Manow 2013; Ohmura 2014; Sieberer 2010; Zittel 2014). 
Those studies which do find behavioural differences tend to emphasise the explanatory power of the 
competition and strategy for re-election rather than the type of electoral mandate received in the 
previous election: Ohmura (2014) shows that MPs with a pure district candidacy strategy are 
significantly more likely to defect than MPs with a pure list or dual candidacy strategy, but, 
interestingly, this is not because of local concerns. Similarly, Sieberer (2010: 494) argues – on the 
basis of analysing the content of EoVs by party rebels – that ‘district MPs use their higher electoral 
independence to deviate from the party line for other reasons’ than ‘cross-pressure … due to 
demands by the party and the local electorate as competing principals’. What could be the other 
reasons then? If district MPs seek the personal vote (Gschwend and Zittel 2015), they are prone to 
engage in constituency service and ‘feel the need to differentiate themselves from their 
parliamentary party by taking positions countering party stands or even by voting against their party 
on issues that are salient to constituents (especially when government survival is not at stake)’ 
(André et al. 2014: 87–8, emphasis added). The main point is that those issues that constituents 
attach most importance to are not necessarily local issues. In Germany, the euro crisis has certainly 
become a prominent issue, and public opinion towards financial aid for Greece has been hostile 
from the start. Given that political parties are generally more pro-European than their voters 
(Mattila and Raunio 2012), the question arises whether district MPs are more responsive to the 
electorate in EU affairs3. For the RCVs on the euro crisis in the Bundestag, we would expect 
defection to be driven by district MPs. It will be interesting to see to what extent list MPs make use 
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of other forms of activity. 
The literature on parliamentary socialisation looks at how newly elected MPs find their own 
role, balance their new responsibilities and learn to manoeuvre in an institutional setting that is 
shaped by antagonistic cooperation, which means that newcomers need to learn how to cooperate 
with competitors inside and outside their own parliamentary party. Best and Vogel (2014: 60) 
conclude that ‘the ambition of newcomers to gain political influence and their lack of resources 
necessary to achieve this goal are the central incentives for these junior legislators to adapt to the 
internal rules and norms’. This being said, our expectation is that lack of experience, measured in 
years of membership in parliament, is correlated with conformist behaviour. Can we therefore 
assume that experienced MPs are more likely to express dissent? It depends on their rank within the 
party. According to Kam (2014: 404), ‘the most rebellious MPs are those who have been demoted 
from the front-bench (and who are unlikely therefore to be ministers again), or those who failed to 
secure a promotion early in their parliamentary careers (and who are likely therefore to languish on 
the backbenches throughout their careers)’. In his study on MPs of the Canadian Liberal Party, Kam 
(2009: 168) finds that ‘demotion was not a consequence of their dissent, but its principal cause’. In 
line with previous studies (e.g. Becher and Sieberer 2008), we hypothesise that German legislators 
in executive, parliamentary or party office are less likely than backbenchers to defect from party 
line in a RCV or publicly disagree with the position of their party. Hence, they should be allowed to 
speak more often. 
While the existing literature does not indicate a significant gender effect with regards to party 
unity, a study by Bäck et al. (2014) suggests that gender could play a role in the allocation of floor 
time. Their analysis of plenary debates in the Swedish Riksdag, which has one of the highest shares 
of female MPs worldwide, shows that women give fewer speeches overall and their 
underrepresentation is particularly pronounced in debates on ‘harder’ policy issues such as 
macroeconomics, transportation, finance and energy. Although the reasons for female 
underrepresentation in specific policy areas are still subject to debate4, we expect some gender-
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based division of labour, regardless of rank and experience, in debates on the euro crisis, which 
despite its complexity can be considered a predominantly macroeconomic and fiscal issue. 
 
Individual-level mobilisation in German Bundestag debates on the Greek crisis 
The German Bundestag is a comparatively strong chamber in terms of its institutional powers (Auel 
et al. 2015), but nonetheless, it is an unlikely case for politicisation. The Bundestag is typically 
described as a ‘working parliament’, meaning that there is a strong focus on legislative scrutiny in 
the standing committees rather than heated debates in the plenary. Despite strong opposition rights 
and a moderately strong EU scrutiny system, contestation of EU affairs is generally limited due to a 
solid pro-European consensus among the major parties (Auel and Raunio 2014). As Kröger and 
Bellamy (2016: 145) note, ‘EU issues have been most debated in [national parliaments] where 
consensus is greatest rather than where it is weakest [and] Germany in particular fits this pattern’. 
Hence, ‘Germany provides perhaps the best paradigmatic example of a system of limited 
contestation’ (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2008: 351). Case studies (see e.g. Auel and Raunio 2014; 
Miklin 2014) support the notion that before the euro crisis there have been only very few instances 
(most notably the Services Directive) when the disputed nature of EU policies has been recognised 
and publicly discussed in the Bundestag. 
The events around the euro crisis presented German MPs with an unprecedented stimulus to 
demand a close involvement in the EU-level crisis management, not least because – as the Federal 
Constitutional Court pointed out on numerous occasions – the parliament’s budget authority was at 
stake and public opinion was highly sceptical about making loan commitments to other member 
states, particularly Greece. Between 2010 and 2015, the Bundestag passed twelve acts that were 
considered decisive for managing and resolving the crisis (see Table 1), and five of those decisions 
centred around aid packages for Greece. 
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Table 1. Bundestag RCVs on euro crisis measures and aid packages. 
Date Acts 
17th legislative term 
7 May 2010 First aid package for Greece 
21 May 2010 Creation of the EFSF 
29 September 2011 Expansion of the EFSF 
27 February 2012 Second aid package for Greece 
29 June 2012 Creation of the ESM 
19 July 2012 Rescue package for Spanish banks 
18 April 2013 Aid package for Cyprus 
 Aid package for Portugal 
 Aid package for Ireland 
18th legislative term 
27 February 2015 Extension of second aid package for Greece 
17 July 2015 Government mandate for negotiations with Greece on third aid package 
19 August 2015 Third aid package for Greece 
 
	
Figure 1. Agreement Index for RCVs on euro crisis measures compared to average levels of the 17th 
term (Bergmann et al. 2016) by party group. 
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Over the course of the crisis, voting unity dropped well below average in all party groups with the 
exception of the Social Democrats (SPD), which became more united after joining the government 
in October 2013 (see Figure 1 for our visualisation of voting unity using the Agreement Index by 
Hix et al. 20035). The Greek crisis has been debated for more than ten hours in the plenary 
assembly, amounting to 74 speeches and 15 interventions/questions. In total, MPs issued 418 EoVs 
regarding the euro crisis, out of which 248 EoVs (including eight oral statements) were in relation 
to RCVs on the Greek situation. This study analyses the voting results, paying particular attention to 
party rebels, and asks who gets to speak in the plenary assembly and who makes use of EoVs and 
why. The primary objective is to gain a comprehensive understanding of the patterns of 
parliamentary mobilisation, and the actors and mechanisms that drive or try to control it. 
 
Data, variables and methods 
We collected data of all MPs and their activities from May 2010 until August 2015. The period of 
observation stretches across two legislative periods and, in total, our data set comprises of 881 MPs. 
394 of them have actively participated in the debates on the Greek crisis, which means they have at 
least once cast a defecting vote, delivered a plenary speech or issued an EoV. For those active MPs, 
we also collected data on the various positions and offices they hold in government, the 
parliamentary party group or central party organisation. 
All votes related to euro crisis measures were recorded, which in itself tells us something 
about their public visibility and the level of importance attached to them. Historically, only around 
5 per cent of votes in the Bundestag are recorded (Bergmann et al. 2016: 26). A RCV needs to be 
requested by one party group or a minimum of 5 per cent of total MPs. Party groups, especially on 
the opposition side, call for RCVs to increase public attention for their own position or to reveal 
internal divisions within their political opponents. Furthermore, RCVs can be used as a strategic 
measure to close ranks and deter potential dissenters. (ibid.: 31) When measuring defection as a 
form of individual-level mobilisation, we also take into account abstentions, because in our case an 
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abstention can be clearly distinguished from being absent. In fact, entire party groups occasionally 
choose to abstain. Hence, any vote that does not follow the party line is counted as deviant6. 
First, we sort our data in a long format so that every observation corresponds to a different 
parliamentary action relevant to the Greek crisis, of which there were five (see Table 1 above). Our 
model specification is Generalized Linear Latent and Mixed Models (GLLAMMs) with adaptive 
quadrature (see Appendix 1). GLLAMMs are ‘a class of multilevel latent variable models for 
(multivariate) responses of mixed type’ (Rabe-Hesketh et al. 2004: 7) including, among others, 
dichotomous categorical responses as it is the case here. We specify three GLLAMMs, one for each 
type of individual-level activity: voting defection, plenary speech and EoV. To ‘relax the 
assumption of conditional independence among the responses for the same person’ (Rabe-Hesketh 
and Skrondal 2012), we assume a two-level model with a random intercept for subjects – MPs of 
the 17th and 18th Bundestag. 
Our ‘core’ independent variables are mandate, rank and experience. Mandate is assigned the 
value of 1 if an MP has been elected directly from a single-member district and 0 if she has been 
elected off the party list. Overall, 48 per cent of Bundestag MPs hold a district mandate, but there is 
a large variation across party groups (see Appendix 2). Rank is a combination of three variables: 
membership in the federal government, central party leader and leading role in the parliamentary 
party. It assumes the value of 1 if the MP was either a member of the government (Chancellor, 
Minister, Parliamentary secretary, Federal commissioner) or a member of the central party 
leadership (Party chair, Deputy party chair, General secretary, Treasurer, Member of executive 
board) or held a high-ranking position in the parliamentary party (President of Parliament, Vice 
President of Parliament, Parliamentary group chair, Deputy parliamentary group chair, (First) 
parliamentary manager); the value of 0 is assigned to all other cases. Experience reflects the years 
served in Bundestag until the year that each parliamentary action regarding the Greek aid 
programmes took place. Responses are grouped into four categories: MPs with experience of eight 
years and less, nine to 16 years, 17 to 24 years, and 25 years and more. Our analysis also controls 
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for gender (0: Male, 1: Female), government coalition and ideological family. Government coalition 
is coded as a dummy, where 1 stands for MPs whose party participated in the coalition of the 17th 
(CDU, CSU, FDP) or the 18th Bundestag (CDU, CSU, SPD). CDU, CSU, FDP are coded as right-
wing parties, whereas the Greens, Left Party and SPD as left-wing ones. 
Under Model 2, we add another variable in order to test whether longer-serving MPs are more 
rebellious than newly elected ones if they sit on the backbenches because they never had a high-
ranking position or have been demoted from the frontbench (Kam 2009; 2014). Therefore, we use a 
dummy variable (‘Exp-backbencher’), where backbenchers are MPs with no position of 
responsibility and experience means membership in the Bundestag for at least two terms (i.e. more 
than eight years). 
 
Descriptive analyses 
In the 17th legislative term, the Bundestag approved the first and second package (in May 2010 and 
February 2012 respectively). In the 18th term, the Bundestag voted on the extension of the second 
package (in February 2015), the government’s mandate for negotiating the third package (in July 
2015) and the adoption of the third package (in August 2015). In the previous term, 26.7 per cent of 
MPs became involved, meaning they gave a speech, defected and/or delivered an EoV in at least 
one of the two debates. For the three debates in 2015, the overall mobilisation rate has increased to 
45.1 per cent. A partial explanation for the higher mobilisation in 2015 is the fact that Bundestag 
MPs had to return twice from summer recession only to debate and vote on the Greek crisis. If we 
exclude the usage of joint EoVs, for which the resources to be spent are rather low if a large number 
of fellow MPs co-sign, we still observe that the mobilisation rate doubled from 15.9 per cent to 30.2 
per cent. This increase is mainly driven by the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), its Bavarian 
sister party Christian Social Union (CSU) and to a lesser extent the Greens, whereas mobilisation in 
the SPD has dropped since they joined the coalition government (see Appendix 3). 
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Table 2. Percentage of total MPs who mobilsied by type of activity. 
Legislative 
term 
 Speech  Defection  EoVs    Individual Joint 
17th term  3.8  5.8  9.6 11.8 
18th term  4.1  16.8  17.0 19.5 
 
Table 2 shows that the level of mobilisation also differs by the type of activity. Merely 4 per cent of 
MPs had the opportunity to address the plenary assembly. Even though in the 18th term the amount 
of plenary speeches has almost doubled (from 27 to 47 speeches), the total number of speakers 
remained stable, which is a first indication of party control. Defection saw a significant increase, 
when in 2015 one in six MPs voted against their own party. We need to keep in mind that the 
government majority is much larger in the 18th term, which means that government parties could 
‘afford’ more deviant votes. In empirical reality, however, Bergmann et al.’s (2016: 47) 
longitudinal study does not provide convincing evidence of a majority size effect on voting unity 
after 1990. 
 
Figure 2. Number of EoVs and EoV signatories for RCV on euro crisis measures and aid packages. 
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Individual and joint EoVs were issued by more MPs as well, indicating that German legislators felt 
a stronger need to communicate their views using the means available to them. We know from a 
recent study by Sieberer (2015: 289–90) that ‘the usage of EoVs … constitutes non-standard 
behaviour’: in the 16th legislative term (October 2005–October 2009), there were on average 3.1 
EoVs by 12.4 individual signatories per RCV. As illustrated in Figure 2, each single crisis-related 
vote exceeds this average significantly, and in February and July 2015 even every fifth MP gave an 
individual EoV or signed a joint one. 
Table 3. Amount of EoVs by type for RCVs on Greek aid packages. 
Roll-call vote EoV type  Support Yes-but Defect Total 
Greece I 
adoption 
Individual  8 17 10 35 
Joint EoVs 0 3 1 4 MPs 0 31 3 34 
Greece II 
adoption 
Individual  15 2 7 24 
Joint EoVs 3 1 2 6 MPs 39 6 4 49 
Greece II 
extension 
Individual  22 15 14 51 
Joint EoVs 1 6 2 9 MPs 2 76 8 86 
Greece III 
negotiations 
Individual  22 27 26 75 
Joint EoVs 3 3 0 6 MPs 28 21 0 49 
Greece III 
adoption 
Individual  8 7 12 27 
Joint EoVs 1 0 2 3 MPs 2 0 13 15 
Total (EoVs) 83 81 76 240 
% 34.6 33.7 31.7 100.0 
Total (MPs) 146 202 97 445 
% 32.8 45.4 21.8 100.0 
 
According to Sieberer (2015), around one quarter of EoVs fully support the party line, another 
quarter explain defection and the other half are of the yes-but type, meaning that MPs voice their 
discontent despite voting along party line. Our analysis of 240 written EoVs that 445 MPs delivered 
for the five voting sessions on the Greek crisis reveals a fairly equal distribution across the three 
categories (see Table 3). Yet overall, MPs most commonly use EoVs to express some doubts or 
differences of opinion, while voting with their party. For the vote on the first aid package, 13 out of 
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14 dissenters gave an EoV in order to express their reasons for defecting. The number of MPs who 
defected grew between 2012 and 2015, but the percentage of dissenters giving an EoV dropped to 
as low as 29 per cent when the Bundestag adopted the third package in August 2015. Governing 
party MPs who give an EoV seem to be more prone to defect in a later vote. To give an example, 
almost every fourth of the 108 CDU/CDU MPs who issued a ‘support’ or ‘yes-but’ EoV in 
February 2015 voted against their own party later that year. In the next section, we test this 
relationship between EoVs and voting defection more systematically using a time series regression 
model. 
Table 4. OR estimates of two-level random intercept logistic. 
  
Speech 
(95% CI)  
Defection 
(95% CI)  
EoV 
(95% CI) 
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 1 Model 2  Model 1 Model 2 
Rank  10.770*** (6.204) 
47.028*** 
(41.995)  
.327** 
(.135) 
1.259 
(.639)  
.491*** 
(.079) 
.530** 
(.124) 
Mandate  1.607 (.719) 
1.515 
(.706)  
1.459 
(.457) 
1.429 
(.441)  
.696** 
(.095) 
.694** 
(.095) 
Experience 
9–16 
 
17–24 
 
25+ 
 
 
 
2.069 
(1.123) 
2.868 
(2.073) 
3.320 
(2.270) 
 
.728 
(.495) 
1.023 
(.826) 
1.213 
(1.110) 
 
 
1.904* 
(.605) 
1.674 
(.741) 
3.879* 
(2.397) 
 
.273* 
(.175) 
.265 
(.181) 
.686 
(.546) 
 
 
.655** 
(.094) 
.850 
(.151) 
.650 
(.218) 
 
.586 
(.171) 
.765 
(.236) 
.588 
(.231) 
Gender  .1946** (.114) 
.1881** 
(.115)  
.997 
(.317) 
1.018 
(.331)  
1.419** 
(.166) 
1.422** 
(.166) 
Government 
coalition  
1.051 
(.687) 
1.338 
(.927)  
.272* 
(.157) 
.277* 
(.166)  
.655* 
(.119) 
.657* 
(.119) 
Ideological 
family  
1.479 
(1.113) 
1.645 
(1.243)  
.087*** 
(.056) 
.080*** 
(.053)  
.562** 
(.099) 
.561** 
(.098) 
Exp- 
backbencher  – 
9.034* 
(9.598)  – 
9.585** 
(6.838)  – 
1.146 
(.353) 
Condition 
number  10.363 14.118  12.918 15.866  9.259 15.159 
MP-level 
variance  
3.841 
(1.276) 
4.187 
(1.386)  
2.154 
(.683) 
2.253 
(.714)  
7.370e-24 
(1.774e-19) 
2.783e-24 
(8.906e-20) 
log likelihood  -182.432 -179.520  -419.934 -414.566  -758.232 -758.149 
N (level 1)  1240 1240  1240 1240  1240 1240 
N (level 2)  401 401  401 401  401 401 
Notes: Estimates have been computed using Stata programme: gllamm; Reference categories: 
‘Backbencher’ (Rank); ‘Party list’ (Mandate); ‘Male’ (Gender); ‘<8 years’ (Experience); ‘Party does not 
participate in government’ (Government coalition); ‘Right wing’ (Ideological family); ‘Backbencher 
with >8 years of experience’ (Exp-backbencher); * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001. 
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Regression analyses 
In Table 4, we present the results of logit models in terms of odds ratio (OR), and robust standard 
errors are given in parentheses. A first observation is that the condition number is small in both 
Model 1 and Model 2 for all models. Although ‘large condition numbers do not necessarily imply 
poor identification’ (Rabe-Hesketh et al. 2004: 20), small numbers indicate that the Hessian matrix 
is not singular and the models are well identified. A second observation is that the variance of the 
intercept for different subjects (i.e. MPs) is virtually zero when EoV is the dependent variable. 
Therefore, in this case one would get the exact same estimates having had pooled the data together 
and run a simple logit model instead of specifying a multilevel analysis. 
Regarding our ‘core’ independent variables, we see that only rank has a statistical significant 
effect in all three types of individual-level activity (with the exception of defection in Model 2). The 
odds to deliver a speech are 11 times larger (47 under Model 2) for frontbench MPs compared to 
lower-rank MPs. The opposite is true in reference to the other two regression models: the odds of 
delivering an EoV or casting a deviant vote are smaller for high-ranking MPs compared to 
backbenchers. These results make for intuitive logic, as MPs in a high-rank position are less likely 
to express grievances against the official party line. 
Interestingly, the regression analysis shows that mandate has a significant effect only in 
reference to EoV. The odds of delivering an EoV appear to be smaller for an MP who has been 
elected from a single-member district compared to an MP who has been elected off the party list. 
This might seem surprising, as one would expect that district MPs are more likely to mobilise, but 
this result confirms that EoVs offer a channel of communication for MPs who find the threshold of 
defection too high or have more to lose. 
Different years of experience appear to have a statistical significant effect somewhat in the 
case of deviant voting. The odds that the most experienced MPs (25 years and more) will vote 
against the party line are four times greater in comparison to MPs with little parliamentary 
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experience (less than nine years). In order to test Kam’s (2009; 2014) argument that experienced 
MPs who sit on the backbenches, because they have either been demoted or never secured a 
frontbench position in the first place, are the most rebellious, we combine experience with rank in 
Model 2. We find that MPs with at least eight years of experience who hold a backbench position 
are more likely than less experienced MPs to defect and to deliver a speech. However the latter 
result does not necessarily imply support of Kam’s argument, since a speech is not a ‘rebellious act’ 
in the same sense as casting a deviant ballot is. 
Looking at gender effects, we find that female MPs are less likely to appear on the plenary 
floor but more likely to give an EoV compared to their male colleagues. As expected, the odds of 
casting a deviant vote and delivering an EoV are smaller for MPs whose party belongs to the 
government coalition than for opposition MPs. Lastly MPs that belong to left wing parties are less 
likely to vote against the party line and give an EoV in comparison to right wing MPs. 
The analysis presented above is static in the sense that it does not take into account previous 
values of the dependent variable(s). Although there is a plethora of scholarly work on the positive 
impact of previous roll call votes on current ones (e.g. Hirano 2008; Degner and Leuffen 2016), to 
the best of our knowledge, there are no empirical findings in reference to legislative speech and 
EoVs. For example: shall we expect that previous occurrences of delivering a speech or EoV impact 
who delivers a speech or an EoV also in the future? To answer the question, we repeat the analysis 
(only for Model 1) adding the lagged value (L.) of the dependent variable in each of the three types 
of individual-level activity. Each activity is lagged by one or two time units (i.e. parliamentary 
actions). The lagged value of speech is added in the first regression model, the lagged value of 
voting in the second one and the lagged value of EoV in the third one. 
A first observation is that rank maintains the same effect and its statistical significance in all 
three types of activities. Table 5 shows that the lagged value of the dependent variable significantly 
affects the dependent one the cases of defection and EoV. More precisely, defecting in a previous 
parliamentary action increases the odds of casting a deviant vote in the future by eleven times. This 
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effect also holds when lagging voting by two time units (Model B). The odds ratio of the lagged 
dependent variable decreases by three units. The effect remains strong, which can be explained by 
the fact that dissenters, especially from the governing parties, have little incentive to change their 
voting behaviour once they have crossed the threshold of defection, given that the issue at hand has 
become more contested while the government’s official position remained largely unaltered. 
Secondly, we see that most other estimates are not reduced dramatically and also maintain their 
statistical significance (compare the results of Model B with those of Model 1 in Table 4). 
Table 5. OR estimates of two-level random intercept logistic with lagged (L.) variables. 
 Speech 
(95% CI) 
EoV 
(95% CI) 
Defection 
(95% CI) 
Defection 
(95% CI) 
(Model B) 
Defection 
(95% CI) 
(Model C) 
L.Speech 3.119 (3.112) 
– – – – 
L.Defection – – 11.245*** (3.100) 
– – 
L2.Defection – – – 8.321*** (4.466) 
– 
L.EoV – .590** (.105) 
– – 2.216* 
(.684) 
Rank 8.550** (6.904) 
.481** 
(.102) 
.404** 
(.116) 
.309* 
(.148) 
.287** 
(.127) 
Mandate 1.133 (.688) 
1.261 
(.256) 
.974 
(.273) 
1.711 
(1.203 
1.367 
(.535) 
Experience 
9–16 
 
17–24 
 
25+ 
 
 
3.226 
(2.320) 
5.074 
(4.542) 
3.707 
(3.320) 
 
.636* 
(.114) 
.872 
(.185) 
.585 
(.197) 
 
1.276 
(.319) 
1.272 
(.404) 
1.222 
(.519) 
 
.903 
(.397) 
1.151 
(.652) 
.874 
(.615) 
 
1.689 
(.650) 
1.345 
(.665) 
2.643 
(1.914) 
Gender .187* (.140) 
1.466* 
(.248) 
.742 
(.194) 
1.430 
(.689) 
.726 
(.284) 
Government 
coalition 
1.064 
(.745) 
.595* 
(.146) 
.394 
(.251) 
.113* 
(.104) 
.243 
(.180) 
Ideological family 1.645 (1.350) 
1.138 
(.270) 
.097*** 
(.062) 
.027*** 
(.026) 
.056*** 
(.046) 
Condition number 12.985 8.906 14.875 14.70 12.615 
MP-level variance 4.366 (3.201) 
8.427e-18 
(2.394e-15) 
5.457e-14 
(1.100e-13) 
1.781 
(.978) 
3.049 
(1.294) 
log likelihood -125.415 -507.606 -288.337 -169.809 -310.299 
N (level 1) 842 842 842 452 842 
N (level 2) 393 393 393 230 393 
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In the case of EoVs, we see an effect in the opposite direction: The odds that an MP will deliver an 
EoV are larger for MPs who did not do so in the previous parliamentary action. Whether drafted by 
a group of MPs or delivered by individuals, EoVs are meant to provide a concise reasoning behind 
the MPs’ voting decision. Therefore, an MP who provided an EoV in the past does not have a 
strong motivation to explain her decision again if her opinion on the issue has remained unchanged. 
What is even more intriguing, our results (see Model C) show that an MP who explained her voting 
decision in the past is two times more likely to defect in a future vote compared to MPs who did not 
deliver an EoV. In other words, EoVs are a first step towards deviant voting and can function as a 
‘warning’ mechanism for party leaderships. 
To sum up, our results reveal a significant effect of a legislator’s rank within his party. Also 
the years of experience as an MP and even gender are relevant in explaining mobilisation patterns 
in the German Bundestag. We find only limited evidence of a ‘mandate divide’, and yet it seems 
that dissenters were rewarded electorally. In the 17th term, there were 37 dissenters in total, of 
which 19 were district MPs and 18 list MPs. 16 of the rebellious district MPs were re-elected in the 
2013 election and three retired. All but one district MP achieved a better result than in previous 
election, and 13 of them outperformed their party (in terms of net gain compared to their party’s 
performance in the respective federal state). While defection may be rewarded electorally, 
especially when public opinion is more sceptical than the political elite, we do not find any 
supporting evidence that rebellious list MPs have been dropped down on the closed party list. (Then 
again, we have to bear in mind that only one list MP from the CDU, i.e. the only government party 
that has a significant share of district mandates, defected in the 17th term.) 
 
Conclusion 
When talking about the politicisation, meaning increasing contestation and domestication, of EU 
politics, we cannot simply assume that national legislatures would be a driving force in these 
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processes. Mobilisation in the parliamentary setting is both enabled and constrained by institutional 
conditions, which are to a large extent shaped by political parties. This study is premised on the 
argument that the German Bundestag is anything but an obvious case of EU contestation. 
Conventionally, the pro-EU cross-partisan consensus is named as the key factor. Since the onset of 
the euro crisis at the latest, cracks emerged in this consensus, and in line with earlier theoretical 
propositions dissent started to form within mainstream parties as least as much as between parties. 
As it is in the interest of the party leadership to maintain a cohesive party label and party discipline 
is generally strong in the Bundestag, we discuss the theoretical implications of party control and test 
how it affects individual-level mobilisation around the Greek crisis, a complex and contentious 
policy issue that has received more and more public attention over the years. 
Overall, mobilisation rates have increased over the course of the crisis, but we find 
considerable intra-party variation in legislative speech, voting defection and the usage of EoVs. 
Party leaders exercise tight control of the Bundestag’s plenary floor, resulting in plenary debates 
dominated by party leaders themselves and other experienced frontbenchers, who toe the party line. 
Party leaders also possess means to discipline legislators who defect from the party line in a 
recorded vote. We do not find clear evidence of a ‘mandate divide’ between district and list MPs, 
but our analysis confirms that backbenchers are much more likely to cast a deviant vote. The same 
is true for EoVs. Despite their limited visibility, EoVs provide an ‘outlet’, that is, a worthwhile 
exercise to raise their voice, for many legislators when controversiality is rising but this is not 
sufficiently reflected in the plenary debates due to party control. The fact that EoVs are even used 
quite extensively to express support for the party position is a meaningful indicator of widespread 
parliamentary mobilisation. Furthermore, to the best of our knowledge, our analysis establishes for 
the first time a link between EoVs and deviant voting, as we show that MPs who justify their voting 
decision are more likely to vote against their party in a future vote. 
As summarised in Figure 3, the mobilisation patterns we identify highlight that when public 
visibility and accordingly the level of party control decreases, participation in general tends to 
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increase, as MPs sitting on the backbenches, MPs with little experience, MPs elected via party lists 
and – in ‘hard’ policy issues like this one – also female MPs are likely to get more involved. 
 
Figure 3. Levels of public visibility, party control and mobilisation by type of activity. 
 
At the beginning of this article we ask whether backbenchers, who tend to be more critical of, for 
instance, extending the EU’s competences any further, have learned to fight back and make their 
voices heard within parliament, as claimed by Raunio and Hix (2000). Out of all variables, our 
results show the most consistent effect regarding MPs’ rank. We can therefore conclude that when 
the controversiality and public attention towards an EU issue are rising, backbenchers in the 
German Bundestag will express their opinion making use of the channels available to them or even 
defect. Since the most prominent channel, namely legislative speech, is closed to them, it remains 
questionable though to what extent they can actually influence the public debate. 
When examining the contestation of EU politics in national chambers of parliament, the 
consideration of institutional conditions is of utmost importance. This study discusses and 
empirically verifies how levels of party control affect what types of MPs participate in the debates. 
For future research, the next obvious step would be to analyse the impact on the actual content of 
the debate. We need to ask how the absence of certain actors shapes the parliamentary debate that is 
visible to the wider public. In other words, why does it matter who speaks for the party?
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Notes 
1.  The OPAL score of institutional strength aggregates 11 indicators to measure access to 
information, the scrutiny infrastructure to process information and formal oversight and 
influence instruments. 
2. We suggest that the notion of controversiality is to be preferred to polarisation, since polarisation 
may in fact mean a narrowing of the political space by reducing the political discussion to two 
opposing or extreme positions. 
3.  The German Politikbarometer survey from September 2011 revealed that when asked which 
party best represents their interestes in managing the euro crisis 14 per cent of respondents said 
none and 28 per cent were not able to answer the question 
(http://www.forschungsgruppe.de/Umfragen/Politbarometer/Archiv/Politbarometer_2011/Oktob
er_II/, accessed 4 March 2017). 
4.  According to Bäck et al. (2014: 507–8), there are three explanatory factors: (1) choices made on 
the basis of personal interests, (2) norms and gender stereotyping in society at large and in party 
organisations, and (3) hierarchies and strategic considerations within the parties. 
5.  The Agreement Index (Hix et al. 2003: 317) is calculated for each RCV as follows: 
!!! = !"# !!,!! ,!! − 12 !! + !! + !! −!"# !!,!! ,!!!! + !! + !!  
where Yi denotes the amount of ‘yes’ votes, Ni the number of ‘no’ votes and Ai the abstentions 
given by a party group i. 
6.  In July 2015, when the Bundestag voted on the government’s mandate for negotiating the third 
aid package, the Greens did not have a whipped party line and this was reflected in very low 
voting unity (as illustrated in Figure 1). In this case, we could not count any votes as deviant in 
order to avoid skewed results. 
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Appendix 1. GLLAMM with adaptive quadrature. 
 
As the GLLAMM is calculated using adaptive quadrature, its accuracy also depends on the number 
of integration points. Initially we run the model with quadrature points set at default (Q-default=8). 
We store the vector of parameter estimates and then pass them as starting values to the new model 
increasing the number of integration points to Q=12. We find that differences between the estimates 
of the two specifications are larger than 0.01%, which is usually the acceptable threshold. 
Increasing each time the number of integration points we notice that estimates are not affected by 
the choice of quadrature when Q=37. Although this number is four times larger than Q-default still 
all models converge very fast (it only takes four iterations for convergence). Following we keep the 
same number of integration points employing this time a model specification (xtlogit, re) that uses 
Gauss-Hermite quadrature (Liu and Pierce 1994; Lessafre and Spiessens 2001). Using the same rule 
of thumb, that is ‘if coefficients do not change by more than a relative difference of 10-4 (0.01%), 
the choice of quadrature points does not significantly affect the outcome’ 
(http://www.stata.com/manuals13/xtquadchk.pdf, accessed 29 March 2017), we find that our model 
converges extremely well for the same number of quadrature points, that is Q=37. The reason that 
there is no difference found in the number of quadrature points between Gauss-Hermite quadrature 
and adaptive quadrature is probably due to the small cluster size. Results from the quadrature check 
between Q=37 and Q1=2×Q/3 and Q2=4×Q/3 are given in Table A (Here we only show the results 
when the response variable is speech). From Table A we see that the largest relative difference 
equals .00001, a number still smaller than the acceptable threshold. 
 
 
 
 
	33 
Table A. Quadrature comparison: Relative differences. 
 Fitted quadrature  37 points 
Comparison 
quadrature 25 points 
--------------- 
Relative difference 
Comparison 
quadrature 49 points 
--------------- 
Relative difference 
Log Likelihood -179.52022 -2.270e-07 1.077e-08   
Rank 3.8507348 2.400e-10 -7.535e-08 
Mandate .41546041 -7.417e-09 1.261e-06 
Experience: 9–16 -.31756756 -6.796e-09 8.602e-07 
Experience: 17–24 .02322377 5.469e-09 .00001423 
Experience: 25+ .19313256 -1.718e-08 3.268e-06 
Gender -1.6706918 -2.149e-09 -5.628e-07 
Government coalition .29099856 -4.790e-09 9.526e-07 
Ideological family .49781043 -7.549e-09 1.011e-06 
Constant 1.4319236 -1.025e-09 -4.833e-07 
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Appendix 2. Count and percentage of district and list MPs by party group. 
Legislative term 
CDU/CSU SPD FDP Left Greens Total 
District List District List District List District List District List District List 
N % N % N % N % N % N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
17th term 218 91.2 21 8.8 64 43.8 82 56.2 0 0.0 93 100.0 16 21.1 60 78.9 1 1.5 67 98.5 299 48.1 323 51.9 
18th term 236 75.9 75 24.1 58 30.1 135 69.9 – – – – 4 6.3 60 93.8 1 1.6 62 98.4 299 47.4 332 52.6 
 
 
Appendix 3. Percentage of MPs who mobilised, including (Mob1) and excluding (Mob2) the usage of joint EoVs, by party group. 
Legislative 
term 
CDU  CSU  SPD  FDP  Left  Greens  Total 
Mob1 
(%) 
Mob2 
(%) 
 Mob1 
(%) 
Mob2 
(%) 
 Mob1 
(%) 
Mob2 
(%) 
 Mob1 
(%) 
Mob2 
(%) 
 Mob1 
(%) 
Mob2 
(%) 
 Mob1 
(%) 
Mob2 
(%) 
 Mob1 
(%) 
Mob2 
(%) 
17th term 12.2 11.7  24.4 20.0  36.7 12.0  22.1 22.1  29.9 26.0  50.0 9.7  26.7 15.9 
18th term 55.1 32.0  54.4 45.6  22.6 12.8  – –  46.2 24.6  65.1 22.2  45.1 30.2 	
